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EFFECTIVENESS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS DURING THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSITION PHASE FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
The United States strategic goal at the onset of the armed conflict in Iraq was to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and to create a free, unified, and democratic Iraq. The necessity of having a unified Iraq derives from its strategic location in the Middle East and from U.S.
commitments to other Middle East countries supporting the war effort, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 1 In order to achieve this strategic goal, the coalition, led by the U.S. military, would need to first insure a secure and stable environment.
Prior to the start of conflict, the Bush Administration assumed that American troops would be viewed as liberators and welcomed by Iraqis with cheers, and would support in the overthrow of Saddam's regime. 2 This did not occur as envisioned. Coalition forces began the attack on Iraq on March 20, 2003 . Initially, as coalition forces moved into Iraq and began to gain control of many of the towns, the masses welcomed the forces in recognition of their new found freedom and impending removal of Saddam's regime. 3 In an attempt to stabilize the region, civil affairs activities began almost immediately in these towns. 4 By 9 April 2003, U.S. Forces were gaining control of Baghdad, 5 the largest city having a population of 4.5 million. 6 However, much of the celebration quickly faded when the citizens found basic services not restored, personal economic situation worsening, and rumors of the U.S. "real" purpose in Iraq being spread as truth, with no rebuttal by the coalition.
Stabilization efforts, during the first sixty days after the start of the war, were significantly hampered by numerous issues clearly within U.S. military's control. Planning for the transition phase was not timely and consisted of several incorrect critical assumptions. These factors, coupled with a lack of security, loss of basic necessities, marginal information control, a severely degraded utility system, shut-down economy, and no oil movement, created challenges in accomplishing stability operations. Failure to take immediate action on identified weaknesses in the transition plan, further impacted these activities. These factors contributed to loss of momentum and "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people and, in turn, caused further disruption and delays in the stabilization progress necessary to achieve a democratic Iraq.
CONDITIONS IN IRAQ
In Iraq, there are numerous organizations, religious sects, and groups of citizens that create internal conflicts between each other or are directed at U.S. efforts. 7 The Shi'a Muslim community comprises 60-65 percent of the population and the Sunni Muslim comprises [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] percent of the population. Christians and others make up 3 percent of the population. Saddam
Hussein's Baath party were primarily Sunni Arabs, the minority in the country. Prior to the armed conflict, cultural resources in the towns were protected, water was plentiful, electricity was available in most areas, and there was fuel for cooking and heating.
The sixty-five percent of Iraqi families employed by the government received their were paid.
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At the beginning of the hostilities, these basic necessities disappeared. In addition to security, each region had its own critical concerns. In Baghdad, trash remained uncollected for over a month after the war started. Standing pools of sewage added to the impending sanitation crises. 12 In Kirkuk, the concerns were primarily fuel shortages and securing property. 13 In Umm
Qasr, clean water flowing 14 and re-establishing food distribution centers was the immediate priority.
15

PRECURSIVE PREDICTIONS ON THE WAR IN IRAQ
Prior to the invasion by coalition forces, there were numerous studies that identified specific areas that must be considered to succeed in creating a free and democratic Iraq.
Although raising concerns and offering viable recommendations, these studies were neither embraced nor acted upon by the military. For example:
• In January 2003, about two months prior to the start of the attack on Iraq by the coalition forces, the Marine Warfighting Laboratory conducted wargaming analysis on the effect the Iraqi people will have on the conflict. This analysis showed that the first thirty to sixty days would be the most critical to influence the Iraqi people and the international community's perception. This report identified three activities that would be, at least initially, the responsibility of coalition forces, and absolutely critical to achieving success: (1) Maintaining a secure environment for the Iraq people, including law and order; (2) Maintaining basic necessities such as water, electricity, fuel, schools, and hospital services; and (3) Rapid return of infrastructure responsibility, including governance, back to Iraqis. The report also stated that potential for violence against coalition forces would increase with time if Iraqis' quality of life did not improve over that realized during Saddam's regime and there must be a transition of governance back to Iraqis. Finally, the analysis stressed that humanitarian assistance groups required a safe and secure environment.
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• The State Department's "Future of Iraq" project, created in April 2002 to study the after-war in Iraq scenario, predicted widespread looting and other criminal activity. These predictions, by creditable and reputable sources, all stress that a secure environment would be necessary to succeed in Iraq. Post-conflict reconstruction and other stabilization activities would be significantly impacted without it.
TRANSITIONAL PHASE TO STABILIZATION
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, defines four phases of a Joint Campaign as
(1) deter/engage, (2) seize initiative, (3) decisive operations, and (4) transition . 21 The transition phase, phase 4, is characterized by stability operations, usually focused on restoring law and order and creating conditions for self-sustaining peace at the conclusion of the operation.
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Stability operations are not normally short term 23 and may occur concurrently with phase 3, combat operations. 24 Military forces needed for combat operations may be significantly different from those required for stability operations. 25 To maintain momentum and exploit the success of combat operations, commanders must reorganize and initiate concurrent stability operations directed at achieving military and political goals. FM 3-0, Operations, provides the following explanation of the Stability Operations:
"Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously." 26 The U.S. goal in Iraq was to achieve a free and democratic country which would require the coalition force to achieve peace in the region. 
FIGURE I. PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
During the coalition's initial stabilization effort, several of the elements making up the principles for the peace operations were violated, they either were not planned for or assumptions were made that precluded the necessity for action. Several assumptions and actions that affected the transition phase were: (1) Major combat operations were expected to last for over two months ; (2) Security requirements were underestimated; and (3) The infrastructure would remain operational, including the police force and ministries. 28 Not only were these assumptions inaccurate, but also the coalition's failure to respond to the changing conditions had a heightened negative affect. This has continued to impact progress towards achieving our political-military strategic goals. Factors that affected the stability operations are related to planning, security, information activities, civil considerations, and training.
PLANNING
Planning combat operations in Iraq was initiated at least six months before the attack. 29 Planning for the transition phase for stabilization operations was significantly delayed. 30 Postwar planning was a second priority to the combat planners. 31 Germany and following World War II. The latter handbook provided a checklist for actions to be taken upon entering the German cities. 39 These are excellent references for planning post-hostilities operations, however, the timing of the research by CFLCC planners was one day after the conflict began.
Joint Publication 3-57 states that "transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is place in this critical area ---plan for transition when planning for intervention." 40 
SECURITY
During combat operations in Iraq, the coalition force was better equipped and far superior in tactics, training, and resolve to win. However, the coalition should have been prepared to execute stability operations, as the enemy was defeated, while still engaging in combat operations. As major fighting ceased, the composition and size of coalition forces did not adequately support combat operations in one region, while initiating stability and security operations in other regions. Security in Iraq was insufficient for many weeks after the major combat ended, as reflected by the looting, vandalism, and armed attacks throughout the country.
Force composition during transition from combat operations to stability operations must change. Unfortunately, this did not occur despite clear guidance to the contrary. Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations , states that the "transition from hostilities to post-hostilities is a volatile and uncertain process. Effectiveness of military operations will often be determined by a force's ability to provide for its security and ensure the safety of the civilian population." 43 Army doctrine specifies that the composition of a post-hostilities force may be substantially different from that needed for combat operations. 44 In order to exploit success and maintain momentum, the reorganization must be integrated into the combat force during the transition phase, rather than during a separate phase. 45 During initial implementation of the transition phase, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
units used in stability operations should be seamlessly integrated with the combat units to insure security is maintained, while humanitarian and other stabilization efforts occur. 
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS:
Numerous accomplishments were made during the first sixty days that directly supported the stabilization process by providing needs to the citizens. However, there were also several issues impacting stabilization progress, such as boundaries, economic, and infrastructure • Within six weeks after entering the Kirkuk region, Civil Affairs were holding multiethnic town meetings.
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• In the Kirkuk region, the local police were receiving training from the coalition force.
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• Seven of the thirteen hospitals in Mosul were operational.
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• To resolve LPG and gas shortages, the coalition organized transport of fuel to Mosul and Baghdad near the end of May 2003.
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• Mail delivery had begun around parts of the country • Oil production was increasing.
• Primary schools re-opened on 4 May 2003.
• Ministry of Health was re-established.
• Water restored to 75% of pre-war capacity in Baghdad. 81 
BOUNDARIES
Baghdad's city functions were subdivided into 9 municipal governments, with each having a Director General. The coalition forces in Baghdad were not arrayed in the same manner . 
ECONOMIC
Local services in many of the cities were still in a state of chaos well after the conflict ended. 83 Civil servants, teachers, and religious facilities workers, were not paid. 84 The total deactivation and unemployment of the several hundred thousand Iraqi military added to the economic upheaval. 85 The economy needed a kick start. British soldiers had funds available and began to hire local workers to be cooks, kitchen helpers, drivers to haul water, and workers for trash pickup. 87 However, U.S. units did not have funds to accomplish these needed tasks until the second week of May 2003. Initially, the Brigade in Baghdad received $25,000 in discretionary funds to accomplish projects in their sector.
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However, commanders, not familiar with the administrative requirements and possible fund restrictions, were hesitant to use it. This delayed the spending needed for critical projects and to kick-start the economy. 89 There was a need for officers trained on use of government funds.
Discretionary funds should have been made available immediately after entering the region to be able to restart the economy and re-establish key services.
INFRASTRUCTURE:
Many Iraqi government employees did not return to work after major fighting ended.
ORHA plans did not consider a total non-functioning government in Iraq. 90 Although this was envisioned, nor was it a common prediction among various advisory researchers, the slow response to rectify the problem was another critical error by the coalition. Effective information operations should have been employed to encourage the Iraqi civil service force to return to work.
Adding to the problems created by the lack of management of infrastructure was the condition of the infrastructure. Of most concern to the stabilization effort was the diminished electrical generating capacity and severe reduction in oil production capability.
Electricity
The availability of electricity to Iraqis was severely impacted as a result of the war and the coalition's failure to secure the utility infrastructure. As a result of Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's electrical generating capacity was reduced from 9,800 megawatts to 380 megawatts. 91 Even with the past twelve years of maintenance neglect, 92 the electrical capacity had been restored to about 4,800 megawatts prior to March 2003. 93 The inability to have electrical power restored ranked second to security in complaints from Iraqis two weeks after the coalition forces entered the city of Baghdad. 94 Although the electrical power systems were not targeted during the assault, some transmission lines were damaged from ground combat. 
Oil Production
Prior to the war, oil was sold under the "Food for Oil" program. Oil production, refinement, and exports stopped with the start of the war. The crude oil storage tanks were full. Liquid petroleum gas (LPG), Iraq's major source for heating homes and water, is a by-product of crude oil production. Without storage capacity, crude oil could not be processed, which in turn, stopped the availability of LPG. The gasoline refinement process produced a fuel oil by-product used by electrical generating plants. The electrical generating plants could not operate at a high capacity due to damaged transmission lines and equipment. This resulted in an excess of fuel oil and full fuel oil storage tanks. The refinement process essentially stopped. The congested oil production system caused many Iraqis not to have fuel for automobiles and LPG for heating, both of which were available before the conflict.
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As with electricity, the lack of heating fuel impacted Iraqi acceptance of the coalition and the stabilization efforts. Knowing that the oil refinement by-products were critical for basic needs of the citizens, plans should have been developed for initially providing the material through the military, inter-agencies, other nations, or NGOs.
TRAINING:
Training for the transition phase of military operations is currently severely lacking. Affairs soldiers, PSYOPS, PAO, Engineers, and medical assets. Transition phase training will insure the timely achievement of strategic goals by the seamless change to stability operations while exploiting the momentum of combat successes.
CONCLUSION:
Significant accomplishments were made that focused on achieving stability in the region.
However, the impacts of these activities were blunted by several factors that occurred prior to and after the start of the war. The following caused the most adverse impacts to the stabilization process:
• Insufficient guidance and training for implementing the transition phase of the operation, needed for the stabilization activities • Failure to establish safe and secure environment • Ineffective use of information operations • Failure to revise or remedy plans found to have incorrect assumptions.
• Funds were not available for impact projects and to resolve critical health issues.
• Funds were not available to pay government employees. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Operation Iraqi Freedom is one of the largest stabilization efforts by the U.S. military since World War II. The experience and lessons learned from the operation provide an opportunity to improve military planning and execution doctrine for future operations. The following recommendations were developed in response to the coalition's actions in Iraq's complex and asymmetric environment:
• Planning for the transition phase should include staged implementation, as the enemy is defeated in each city or region.
• Initially, the planning for the transition phase must anticipate concurrent operations with the combat phase, phase 3, with force structure enhanced to support combat, security, and stability operations.
• Transition planning must provide for immediate security of region to insure law and order is maintained and to protect people and key facilities.
• Planning must include protection of essential services, agencies and cultural sensitive sites.
• Planning for essential services should include either the rapid restoration of service or means to provide service through other sources.
• Plans for information operations must be continuous throughout the operation and must maintain the focus for achieving the U.S. strategic goals.
• Prior to deployment, selected Civil Affairs Officers must be trained as Contracting
Officers, qualified to commit funds for impact projects.
• To further legitimize the military operation, funds for impact projects and other economic issues must be available immediately after major fighting ends in each region.
• To provide a unity of effort in stability operations, the boundaries for the military units should be adjusted to match the local municipal boundaries as soon as practical after the start of the transition phase.
• Challenging leader training for stability operations must be developed and integrated into realistic scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training Center and at the National Training Center exercises.
• Commanders must be prepared to rapidly develop and execute branch and sequel plans that arise from changing conditions and incorrect assumptions.
• Planners must research and evaluate creditable studies related to the operation and develop plans for applicable recommendations.
SUMMARY
To maintain the momentum of victory on the battlefield, a transition phase must be well exhibited from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Commanders must be able to seamlessly integrate effective stability plans in order to maintain the U.S. public resolve and achieve the military and political strategic goals.
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